

Presentational (Linguistic) Aspects of Strategic Manoeuvring via Dissociation

[...] true justice seeks nothing more in a speech than neither to offend nor to entertain [...]
(*On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, Aristotle)

Introduction

In this paper I am approaching the technique of dissociation¹ from a linguistic perspective. Dissociation I view as a discourse, and not primarily as an argumentative, technique since I consider that it is used at a very general level to construct a new notion by splitting up an existing notion into its constitutive elements in order to use part of or all of them in combination with some other notion(al aspects / elements). Dissociation thus results in:

- (1) maintaining the old / initial notion (deprived of argumentative potential), and
- (2) building a new notion, the dissociated notion (endowed with argumentative potential).

These are also called the two terms of the dissociation, which can be eventfully opposed to each other as representing the apparent notional content / representation and the real one, needed or aimed at in a particular discourse situation. This virtual opposition, or, at least, possible comparison, between the two notional representations allows the new notion to be used and valued argumentatively. In discourse which is not argumentative by nature, but expository, dissociation can be viewed merely as meant to present a new notional representation or to clarify a new notional content distinguished from an existing notion. Nevertheless, since dissociation is “the technique of sundering previously constructed integrities, primarily by showing the unstable, illusionary, and false nature of the prior association” (Goodwin 1991: 150, cf. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958), it is to be expected that it will serve as a most convenient technique in argumentation “by postulating a principle against which conflicting claims can be judged, and, in this way, help to resolve the impasse created by incompatibilities” (*ibidem*)².

¹ Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) distinguish between argument schemes based on association and argument schemes based on dissociation. Dissociation can be represented as a technique meant to split off a unitary notion into its constitutive aspects based on the opposition between *appearance* and *reality*. The objective is to reconstruct the notion as: 1) a “reduced” notion, referred to either by the same term or by a new expression (term I, T I) that is assigned in the context to the “old” notion, as it was initially represented by the antagonist or by the audience – it is said to belong to the realm of *appearance*; 2) a “new” notion, referred to by a new term, by the old one or by some distinctive expression (term II, T II) that is assigned to what the speaker considers to be the “true” meaning corresponding to the notion or the “interpretation” she gives to it in a particular pragmatic / interactional context – it is said to belong to the realm of *reality*.

² A good example in point is the distinction between Newtonian physics and Quantum physics (Goodwin 1991: 150): either is equivalent to a principle / criterion / norm, yet a particular claim *p* standing as true when referred to the former stands as no longer true when referred to the latter. This is why dissociating between the two is necessary to argue in favour of *p* or non *p*.

I suggest, at a very general level, that the study of dissociation from a linguistic perspective should comprise investigation at the following two layers:

1. the linguistic proper layer, at which (a) lexical (lexical semantics), (b) syntactic, (c) pragmatic considerations are good candidates for discussing the argumentative potentialities of dissociation;
2. the “aesthetic”, or proper stylistic, layer, at which consideration on (a) tropes, (b) arrangement (discourse structure), (c) register contribute to a clearer description of how dissociation works argumentatively.

Such considerations should make it obvious that dissociation is not to be mistaken with semantic shift, distinction, precization, clarification, while these can be constitutive elements of it.

From an argumentative standpoint, dissociation is equivalent to a strategic maneuver which allows the speaker to strengthen his / her position by working / elaborating on the notional and linguistic material that the argumentative situation provides (a notion and its corresponding, denomination, definition, use by the other party).

1. Brief Overview of Characteristics of Dissociation

The theoretical background of a discussion concerning dissociation in the framework of argumentation studies is provided by several perspectives taken to it so far, which also ensure the following main starting points of my presentation:

- 1) dissociation allows a more or less profound transformation of the conceptual / notional data which underlie argumentation, by (temporarily and / or situationally) sacrificing an old accepted notion against a new one, proposed as a criterion for the construction of the real (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 551, 552);
- 2) dissociation is a strategy by which a speaker “attempts to break up a previously unified idea into two concepts: one which will be positively valued by the audience, and one which will be negatively valued” (Schiappa 1985: 73, according to the *New Rhetoric*);
- 3) dissociation provides grounds for answering – at all moments of a linguistic exchange – not the question *What is X?* but the question *What X ought to be?* (*idem*: 79);
- 4) dissociation aims at selecting and preserving “certain meanings to the diminution of others” (*idem*: 80);
- 5) “dissociation plays an important role in restructuring a community’s linguistic understanding of reality” (*idem*: 81);
- 6) through the argumentative move of distinction, upon which dissociation relies, disputants can distinguish not only reality from appearance, but also between / among appearances by choosing “the least illusory [...] element” or between / among various realities, “so that they may be treated as ‘equal but opposite’, with no one element being ranked over the others” (Goodwin 1991: 152);
- 7) dissociation can function as an argumentative strategy only if it is recognized as such by the addressee, the possible consequences of this recognition being that (s)he accepts to play a role in the critical discussion (of protagonist or antagonist of a standpoint) and that the dissociation thus admitted of as argumentative move leads to resolving the dispute successfully by making the antagonist renounce his doubts or the protagonist abandon his initial

- standpoint, and this by not “presenting the dissociation as if it were already accepted” by the addressee / other party (cf. Grootendorst 1998: 288);
- 8) dissociation, “if not accepted at first hand”, should be “put up for discussion” and “conclusively defended”, so that it stays dialectically sound (cf. van Rees 2007: 1116);
 - 9) dissociation can contribute, in terms of dialectical reasonableness, to “creating clarity about standpoints, to generating shared starting points for attacking and defending arguments, and to ensuring that the conclusions drawn from the discussion are optimally precise” (*ibidem*);
 - 10) dissociation is used, in terms of rhetorical effectiveness, to represent a state of affairs in such a way that the discussant’s position is strengthened, often by categorical statements, concessions (*idem*: 1113) or persuasive definitions;

To these general remarks about dissociation adds the pragmatic perspective on dissociation, which allows to view it as mainly represented by two speech acts: *distinction* and *definition*, belonging to the usage declarative speech act category. In this framework, both distinction and definition are shown to participate in dissociation as explicit, implicit or indirect speech acts, their potential contribution to solving the difference of opinion being such as to bring about “clarity of discourse” and solve up “demarcation problems”. (van Rees 2005a)

To add one more characteristic of dissociation, in order to counter-argue the opinion that dissociation is (always) manipulatory³, I advance that a non-manipulatory dissociation is one that complies with one of the sincerity conditions of argumentation, a responsibility condition: a proposition should be presented as a(n acceptable) dissociation (a usage declarative of definition or distinction) only if the speaker or writer really believes that it is an acceptable definition and / or distinction and that it is clearly advanced in an effort of ‘depicting’ the real in words most suitable to a given context (following van Eemeren 2005⁴).

I conclude that the *New Rhetoric*’s approach to dissociation can be well complemented by the systematic approach to it provided by van Rees. This is essentially the theoretical foundation of my present analysis.

2. A Suggested Analytical Model of Dissociation used in Argumentation

My previous research on dissociation (Gâță 2007), based on studies concerning distinction, persuasive definitions and dissociation (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, Goodwin, Schiappa, Grootendorst, van Rees), has suggested that there are several constitutive elements of dissociation, which I have also dealt with as *stages of dissociation*, taking into

³ I have sometimes met an informal objection to accepting dissociation as such in discourse, by ordinary speakers in ordinary contexts of argumentation, whether it was dialectically sound or not, or I have noticed some analyst discussants’ perspective on it as being manipulatory.

⁴ “We [Rob Grootendorst and F. H. van Eemeren] associated manipulation with one of the ‘sincerity conditions’ of argumentation. The sincerity condition we had in mind is violated if a proposition is presented as an acceptable justification or refutation of a standpoint while the speaker or writer does not really believe that it constitutes an acceptable defence. In such cases, we observed, the speaker or writer who performs the (complex) speech act of argumentation is guilty of a form of misleading that amounts to an attempt at manipulation. Whether or not the listener or reader is aware of the ‘infelicity’ of the justification or refutation, he or she is always entitled to hold the speaker or writer responsible for having pretended to offer a justification or refutation as the case may be. [...] This is why we renamed Searles’ sincerity conditions as *responsibility conditions*. (van Eemeren 2005: ix-x)

account the fact that they can be reconstructed as speech acts with argumentative potential. These stages are:

- 1) identification of complementary constitutive aspects of a notion;
- 2) seizing incompatibility among some of the aspects distinguished;
- 3) separation of notional constitutive aspects into (at least) two notional subsets (one more subset could be identified as the core notional subset);
- 4) discarding one set of aspects as not conforming to the speaker's representation of the notion – partially negating the notion itself;
- 5) accepting / maintaining the other set of aspects as conforming to the speaker's representation of the notion – partially conceding the notional representation;
- 6) adding other notional aspects to one of the notional subsets, by linguistic and notional elaboration:
 - a. syntactic determination;
 - b. definition;
 - c. precization;
 - d. explicitization;
- 7) constructing the new notional representation;
- 8) terming the new notion (naming it with a term or with a new, recognizable phrase that acquires the properties of a term, as referred to in the branch of lexicology called terminology);
- 9) standardizing the new notion;
- 10) valuing the notion from an argumentative perspective.

In most contexts of dissociation, not all of these stages are linguistically represented and the ordering may be different from the one above-mentioned.

Viewing dissociation as such amounts to conceiving it as a complex discourse technique useful in argumentative exchange to provide other starting points for a discussion than those provided by the initial context of a linguistic interaction.

3. On Dissociation and Exposition

According to David J. Hill, discourse “aims to produce a change (1) in the mind, (2) by means of ideas, (3) expressed through language” (Hill, D. J. 1883: 39). One particular type of discourse identified by Hill, namely Exposition (the other three being Description, Narration, and Argumentation), corresponds in my view to the class of ideas directly touched upon by the discourse technique of dissociation. This class of ideas corresponds to that of *general notions*: “A *general notion* is unfolded to the mind by Exposition” (*Idem*: 74).⁵ Exposition as a mode of discourse can admit of analysis and / or requires explanation, while *explanation* could also include Description⁶, if one keeps in mind that Description serves to present to the mind the “parts of a simultaneous whole” (*Ibidem*).

Taking into account the findings of recent studies on dissociation and assuming that the analytical model previously sketched is correct in stipulating that dissociation theoretically relies on such moves as definition, negation, distinction, concession, I consider that the type of discourse used when performing a speech act of dissociation is Exposition. I will cite or remind in what follows several characteristics of Exposition

⁵ Exposition does not appear in Adam S. Hills' *Principles of Rhetoric* (1878), where only narration and description, on the one side, and argumentation, on the other, are seen as “kinds of composition”.

⁶ Cf. Henry Day, *The Art of Discourse*, cited by Abbott 2007: 11.

which also concern or have impact on, at some point, presentational or linguistic devices used in performing a dissociation. Thus, Exposition:

- 1) “consists in such an analysis of a general term as will make clear to the mind the general notion of which it is the sign” (*idem*: 95);⁷
- 2) can assume “two forms: (1) Exposition of the notion in itself [or *logical exposition* (*idem*: 105)]; and (2) exposition of the notion in its relation to other notions” (*idem*: 95);
- 3) is of use in making clear, by analysis, both the *comprehension* of the notion, i.e. “the different attributes included in the notion”, which can be achieved by means of the logical definition of the notion⁸, and the *extension* of the notion, i.e. “those objects which are included in the general notion” (*idem*: 97)⁹, by also taking into account the fact that “a notion cannot be divided when it includes only one object” (*idem*: 98)¹⁰;
- 4) may serve to explicate a notion in itself by means of a definition and / or a division;¹¹
- 5) may also serve to explicate a notion through its relations to other notions by one of the following methods: the method of particulars, the method of conditions, the method of similars, the method of contrast (*idem*: 105-106)¹².

Since dissociation is related to definition (by relying on, at least, implicit, if not explicit definition), one can admit as true of dissociation what one admits as true of definition. In other words, in my view, if dissociation can be seen as relying on a discourse structure than can be qualified as belonging to the Exposition type of discourse, then all of the preceding linguistic operations can be used in dissociation. According to the particular circumstances (usually of institutional nature) of each discourse instance, one may thus admit that

“we shall be forced very often to turn aside from the dictionaries and by search in essays, books by specialists, in our own experience, by careful examination of the word, and by thought, upon them, to reach through analogy,

⁷ “By ‘general term’ is meant a word indicating a general notion. By ‘general notion’ is meant a mode of thought in which certain attributes are taken as belonging to certain objects, and as uniting them in one class.” (Hill, D. J. 1883: 95)

⁸ “The exposition of the comprehension of a notion is its logical definition”, which is “a division of a general notion according to its attributes”, one of which is a constituent notion *including* the notion defined, the *genus*, the other one being constituent notion *distinguishing* the notion defined from the *genus*, the *differentia*. (cf. Hill, D. J. 1883: 97)

⁹ “The exposition of the extension of a notion is its division.” (*Ibidem*)

¹⁰ Comprehension and extension “are in an inverse ratio to each other” (*ibidem*), which means that “as the list of attributes is lengthened, the list of objects possessing them is shortened; and viceversa” (*idem*: 98).

¹¹ Definitions can be *nominal*, or “mere explications”, “generally preliminary to a more precise distinction” (*ibidem*), *real*, in which “the object defined is considered as existing and the notion precedes the definition”, being “merely analytic, nothing being given explicitly in the defining member which is not contained implicitly in the subject defined” (*idem*: 99), or *genetic*, such a definition representing “the defined object as in the process of becoming”, being therefore synthetic and possible “only when the objects to be defined are quantities represented in time or space” (*ibidem*). In its turn, division can be of two types: *partition*, which is the “division of a notion into its component attributes”, by enumeration of “all the attributes which make up a whole” and having to do with the comprehension of the notion (*idem*: 100-101), and *logical division*, which exposes the extension of a notion by enumeration of the species of a notion (*idem*: 101).

¹² The method of particulars serves to “explicate a notion by mentioning particular cases or concrete instances”, which “is a simple expedient, adapted to a low order of intelligence, and requiring no powers of generalization.” (*Idem*: 105). The method of conditions helps explicate a notion by mentioning “the conditions essential to its production or existence”, or circumstances, which also include cause and effect.” (*Idem*: 105-106). The method of similars is used to explicate a notion “by comparing it to similar notions”, by taking into account that “no direct similitude is necessary, but simply a resemblance of relations.” (*Idem*: 106) The method of contrast consists in explicating a notion “through its opposite”, by thus making reference to a notional polarity. (*Ibidem*)

exemplification, analysis of the word, detailed description iteration, antithesis, their *real* meaning.” (Baker 1898: 59; my emphasis)

4. Attacking a Standpoint through Dissociation

In a critical discussion the two parties may use dissociation at any stage. In what follows, I will deal with what might be called the second move of the confrontation stage, by which the antagonist of a standpoint raises criticism against the standpoint advanced by the protagonist

“by presenting an opposing standpoint. The antagonist then becomes protagonist of an opposing standpoint. The specific contribution of dissociation to performing this dialectical move, because it involves a distinction between what is and what is not the case, is that the antagonist becomes protagonist of a *multiple* standpoint: not only does he bring forward the opposing standpoint but he brings forward a particular other standpoint as well.” (van Rees 2006: 476)

I believe that what is true of dissociation at this particular stage of the critical discussion can be true of it when any other move is made at any other particular stage of the critical discussion. In all the following¹³ either of the two parties making use of dissociation chooses to word his / her position in ways most persuasive and easiest to reach their argumentative and communicative goals:

- a. delineating a particular standpoint against the background of other possible standpoints, criticizing the standpoint brought forward by the protagonist by presenting an opposing standpoint, giving a particular interpretation of one’s original standpoint and maintaining it in that interpretation or withdrawing the original standpoint confronted with criticism, at the confrontation stage,
- b. delineating a specific starting point for the defense of the original standpoint against the background of other possible standpoints, criticizing a starting point which contributes to advancing the original standpoint, at the opening stage,
- c. criticizing an argument scheme that connects the argument with the protagonist’s standpoint, at the argumentation stage,
- d. giving a more precise interpretation of the standpoint which the participants decide has or has not proved tenable in view of the criticism brought forward against it, at the concluding stage.

Thus dissociation is achieved by using specific linguistic devices, of which only three are dealt with in what follows: repetition of lexical items present in the standpoint, reporting the standpoint to be attacked by modalization of reporting devices with verbs of appearance (*seems / appears to believe*), and use of *but* as to direct the other party towards another standpoint, which is the basis for dissociation

¹³ All of the following are dialectical contributions of dissociation to solving the difference of opinion (cf. van Rees 2006).

5. Antagonist voicing the protagonist's standpoint: repetition of lexical items and of sentence / notional content

In excerpt (1.) from an interview¹⁴, DC, the interviewer, asks a question that can be also considered as putting forward the standpoint that AN feels *completely American*, by also leaving room for the addressee's criticizing or opposing this standpoint (tag-question *don't you?*):

1.

DC: When we first met, you were the most exotic person it had been my good fortune to meet in Pittsburgh, and yet you feel completely American, don't you?

AN: I feel very much at home in America. And I'm sure that my Greek friends and family think of me as American. But I speak perfect Greek, I've never lost my accent. [1]

AN's wording can be considered as falling very much in line with DC's (and virtually his Greek family's and friends') opinion. Several linguistic aspects plead in favour of this interpretation; they can be referred to as devices meant to speak AN's own position and can be also used to reconstruct AN's position as equivalent to DC's position, thus appearing to strengthen the standpoint initially advanced, corresponding to *AN feels completely American* or *AN is American*. In this way, both DC and AN seem to play the protagonist's role in a virtual discussion. The following linguistic devices point to such an interpretation:

- a) repetition by AN of the lexical items *feel, American* (also *America*);
- b) Reference to (repetition of) (nearly) the same semantic content in two successive sentences: *I feel very much at home in America. And I'm sure that my Greek friends and family think of me as American*; each of the sentences is complete in itself, but they are joined to express a total meaning, which may be regarded as falling in the same semantic and notional line with DC's initial statement¹⁵.

Thus, AN does not deny that he is an American, but also implicitly acknowledges his belonging to a particular category of Americans-coming-from-other-cultures-but-still-belonging-to-their-own. This implicit distinction gives way to what I consider to be a dissociation in this context. If this view is correct, the previously mentioned linguistic devices are not used to show AN's genuine commitment to DC's (and Greek friends' and family's) standpoint, but to allow for concession with respect to the others' position, and thus place AN in the antagonist's role. This dissociation is of use to approach – from the antagonist's side – the virtual difference of opinion that may be presumed as existing between his *Greek friends and family*, who *think of him as American*, and himself, who considers that speaking one's native language means being *still part of that society*. The interview goes on as follows:

2.

DC: Because you've gone back regularly?

AN: Yes. And because speaking the language shows me that I am still part of that society as well. [...] [1]

¹⁴ See parts of the interview in Appendix 1.

¹⁵ On the one hand, such a wording might be considered as *interpretatio*, or *synonymy* at the level of sentence content; on the other, they could be looked at as the figure of speech called *membrum*, which is equivalent to communicating an identical meaning in two (or three) succinct successive sentences.

To put it more clearly, DC has advanced the standpoint – which can also be the standpoint of a large category of people who know AN – that *AN feels completely American*.¹⁶ At least, AN holds his Greek friends and family committed to this (more or less the) same standpoint. Although his reply in (1.) – owing to the devices mentioned above and to the lack of explicit denial – first looks as if he agrees to DC’s standpoint, there are at least several (linguistic) reasons for which the hearer or the reader of the interview / the analyst may be entitled to consider that this conversational exchange voices a difference of opinion / can be reconstructed as the confrontation stage of a critical discussion in which AN plays the role of the antagonist criticizing the standpoint of the protagonist (DC, AN’s Greek friends and family). In my opinion, AN’s wording puts to work several linguistic patterns that can also be regarded as devices meant to show at the same time partial agreement to the standpoint *AN is American* and partial denial of it by introduction of a dissociation between *looking perfectly adapted to American culture* (appearance – *feel*) and *belonging to two different cultures* (reality – *be*). DC’s wording about AN’s feeling *completely American* is not repeated as such or simply agreed to by AN, who re-words it as feeling *very much at home in America*, the following linguistic elements contributing to voicing an opinion different from DC’s:

- 1) repetition of the word *feel*, this time used to stress upon the distinction between *feeling* and *being*;
- 2) use of *very much* as iterating the semantic contents of *completely*, yet stressing upon the difference between the two and thus opposing it to *completely*, which shows that AN’s degree of commitment to the standpoint advanced by DC is not equal to the latter’s;
- 3) use of the phrase *feel ... at home*, in which *home* has a double reference, since it can point as well to *America* and to *Greece*, with *America* perceivable as *like home*, although the sentence as a whole can be perceived as referring to the condition of *being an American*;
- 4) use of a kind of repetition of ideas in *And I’m sure that my Greek friends and family think of me as American. But I speak perfect Greek, I’ve never lost my [Greek; my addition] accent*, meant to insist upon and bring about presence for the notional content “Greece / Greek culture”, to implicitly convey that the adaptation to American culture has not been *complete*;
- 5) use of the opaque expression *think of me as American*, to contrast the belief of Greek friends and family (based on appearance) to the speaker’s belief, what he thinks of himself, based on reality (of personal emotions and feelings); the ambiguity of the *think-of* expression¹⁷ is played upon since *They think of me as American* has at least two readings: one in which *I am American* is true and one in which this is false; putting his actual “condition” in these words, the truth value of *I am an American* stays opaque, that is the utterance admits of two readings: a *de re* reading, in which the existence of some X is asserted (*I am an American*), and a *de dicto* reading, in which the existence of some X is not (*I am not an American*); the whole excerpt is saying neither *I am* nor *I am not an American*, but something like

¹⁶ “The difference of opinion can be expressed explicitly, but in practice it may well remain implicit. In the latter case, it is either assumed in the argumentative exchange of views that a difference of opinion exists or the possibility of a difference of opinion is anticipated. Without such a real or presumed confrontation, there is no need for a critical discussion.” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 60)

¹⁷ “In linguistics, verbs that give rise to a *de dicto-de re* distinction are known as “opaque” verbs, where the opacity describes the fact that we cannot see through the verbal context to know whether a noun within it is a referring expression or not. [...] Verbs pertaining to lack or desire (of which “look for” is one) and thought or attitude (such as “believe” and “regard”) are major classes of opaque verbs.” (Anderson 2008: 1015)

I may appear (to everybody) as an American (appearance – which justifies the concession) but I also feel myself/ am Greek;

- 6) repeated reference to the notional content *America* (*I feel very much at home in America. And I'm sure that my Greek friends and family think of me as American*) by implicitly contrasting it with the notional content *Greece*, referred to three times in the corresponding adjective(s) and noun: *And I'm sure that my Greek friends and family think of me as American. But I speak perfect Greek, I've never lost my [Greek; my addition] accent*¹⁸;

The dissociation thus consists in opposing or confronting two sets of aspects that are not both explicited (X, but not X', where X' stands as non Y, and Y can be perceived as different from X, although X and Y can be conceived of as part of the same notional category – “belonging to some culture”):

X (Standpoint advanced)	but	Y (Attack of the standpoint by dissociation)
AN lives and works in America <i>AN feels [and appears] American</i>		AN is Greek by birth <i>AN speaks perfect Greek AN has never lost his [Greek] accent</i>

X corresponds more or less to something like *AN is American*.

Y corresponds to something like *AN is Greek*.

X' corresponds to something like *AN is not Greek / AN does not have any link to Greek culture*.

Thus, non X' reads as something of the type *It is not true that AN is not a Greek / It is not true that AN does not have any link to Greek culture*.

This amounts to interpreting the excerpted fragment as one of the following:

<i>In reality,</i>	<i>I am American (by adoption)</i>
	<i>and</i>
	<i>I am Greek (by birth and by my ties with the Greek society)</i>
	<i>I belong to both cultures</i>
	<i>I am both American and Greek</i>
	<i>I am neither completely American, nor completely thought of as a Greek in Greece</i>

and, by way of dissociation, as *I am not a complete American, but one who is American and Greek at the same time, which an American is not*. In fact, the dissociation attacks not as much the standpoint as the degree of “Americanness” that AN is ascribed.

The dialectical potential of this particular dissociation between AN's apparent personality and his real one is that: 1) An addressee confronted with a statement X (which can be interpreted and reconstructed as a standpoint) put forward by a speaker advances in his turn a reformulation Z (X, but Y) of the statement X, which linguistically speaking looks pretty much like X but does not exactly amount to the same meaning and, under careful examination, betrays the second speaker as not holding exactly the same position:

¹⁸ Repetition of the same of the notional content “America” at the end of the clause can be linked to repetition of a word at the end of a clause, known as the figure of speech *epistrophe*, or *epiphora*.

feeling completely American is not exactly the same as *feeling very much at home in America*; the latter could be equated to *not feeling completely American*, and as such to the opposite of X. This makes the conversational exchange move into an implicit dispute. Not only reconstructing it from this point on (confrontation stage) as a critical discussion, but also interpreting it as such is legitimate. 2) The addressee also advances – implicitly – another standpoint, corresponding to Y: *preserving the link with the native culture*. These utterances being performed one may speak about the virtual roles of protagonist and antagonist to be distributed in the following stage. Since a second standpoint has been advanced, the difference of opinion is multiple mixed and AN acts at the same time as an antagonist of X and as a protagonist of Y, and at the same time as holder of the dissociation between his apparent personality (*feeling and looking completely / very much American*) and his real personality (*being American and Greek at the same time*).

The rhetorical potential at this stage of the discussion is that the original standpoint X is set aside by making place for the attack *not non Y* and for the standpoint Y (which *not non Y* amounts to). As the continuation of the interview shows it, the protagonist role of Y will be maintained by AN who could have simply positioned himself as antagonist of X, making use of the moves available to him from this position. Since the interview is mainly concerned with his person, acts and, more or less, public image, it is more convenient to him to act as a protagonist in what follows: as a interviewee, he is expected to be given more space / time to advance information on himself and this also allows him to advance standpoints concerning his own personality, the burden of proof resting with himself. Under such circumstances he can give the discourse the more effective direction towards building his ethos. The wording is effective in reformulation of the other party's standpoint and in presenting a new standpoint to be conveniently defended by its protagonist. This is affordable owing to the following devices:

- 1) repetition of lexical items and notional content in the initial standpoint is strategically used in the antagonist's reformulation of the standpoint, which insensibly changes into its opposite;
- 2) absence of explicit denial, leaving room for and changing to generous concession (*very much, at home in America, think of me as American*);
- 3) a "reality" assumed as such by the initial protagonist is shown to be apparent and shaped into a more acceptable reality: AN's Americanness is only an appearance or only one side of his personality, his real condition being something else;
- 4) the notion of "complete Americanness" is devalued – with respect to AN's personality – and another more accurate and effective notion is progressively, yet implicitly, construed as more valuable, that of "equally belonging to the American and the Greek cultures";
- 5) the potentially negative aspects or connotations corresponding to the initial notion are swept off.

The dissociation between AN's apparent condition – that of an American – and his real condition – that of a Greek and an American at the same time – is more obvious in the latter part of the interview, where implicitness is left aside for complete explicitness with respect to being American and / or Greek. AN's standpoint on his condition – opposite to the one DC voices at the beginning and to that of AN's Greek friends and family – is expressed as part of an enumeration of "conditions" that together define his personality, so that it will be very difficult to break the link between these – see last reply in excerpt (3.), where the same dissociation is performed, continued or re-shaped:

3.

AN: [...] So here is a group for which I perhaps speak – philosophical "cosmopolitans" and cosmopolitans in general. Cosmopolitans refuse to belong exclusively to a single tribe, whether the tribe is a nation, a profession, or a discipline. I think of myself as a cosmopolitan. To be a cosmopolitan is not to belong nowhere; it is to belong to many places.

DC: But you are a Greek-American.

AN: I am not a Greek-American. I am a Greek. And an American. And also a Spanish citizen. And a philosopher. And a critic. And I like Proust. And television. And argument. Interpretation. Intelligence. Sensibility. [1]

This time the speech act of denial of DC's standpoint is explicit. This time, the dialectical effect is that the standpoint of the protagonist *You are a Greek-American* is attacked by AN who clearly puts forward 1) the opposite standpoint *I am not a Greek-American* (consisting in repetition of the statement in the negative) and 2) two other standpoints: *I am an American* and *I am a Greek* (followed by other statements which could also have standpoint roles). On the other hand, repetition is again played upon by means of a syntactic parallelism stressing upon the final element of each sentence. This dissociation is supported by a previous definition which is also part of another dissociation: *Cosmopolitans refuse to belong exclusively to a single tribe, whether the tribe is a nation, a profession, or a discipline. (I think of myself as a cosmopolitan.) To be a cosmopolitan is not to belong nowhere; it is to belong to many places.* The dissociation leads in this case to something like:

AN is a Greek-American (in appearance), but in fact (in reality) he is an American and a Greek (at the same time) and not merely a Greek or an American.

An American is different from someone who is at the same time an American living in America and a Greek staying connected to Greece.

AN belongs to Greece and America / to many cultures / places ...

Moreover, the explicitization of the other places AN belongs to 'develops' the dissociation in conformity with the definition advanced for *cosmopolitan*. The result of the dissociation would read as *I am not (merely) an American*, but as *I belong to such places as America, Greece, Spain, philosophy, (literary) criticism, Proust, argument, ...*

Coming back to the analysis of excerpt (1.), AN's reply partly (seems to voice or indeed) voices his commitment to the standpoint *You feel completely American* and partly departs from it in an implicit way: *But I speak perfect Greek, I've never lost my accent.* In this particular situation, the addressee can be held committed to the following implicit or virtual standpoints:

(A) *People coming to America from other cultures may completely adapt to American culture / feel very much at home in America.*

Commitment to this standpoint could be regarded as potentially disadvantageous with respect to AN's (public) image. The notion referred to above can be further detailed and nuanced by means of another standpoint:

(B) *Some of these people may also continue to speak their native tongue perfectly.*

Commitment to these two standpoints creates, in my opinion, commitment to distinguishing between these two categories of people (that of the *complete American*, which could be perceived negatively, and that of the “American by immersion” who nevertheless belongs to his native culture), which amounts to performing the dissociation between AN’s apparent and real personality. The dissociation creates for its author the possibility to replace the initial standpoint without refuting it and to better defend his (second) standpoint. This also allows him to implicitly qualify as mistaken the position of those who consider him *completely American*, by correcting their view through strategic use of repetitions and avoidance of any explicit denial (assertive) act.

This analysis also takes into account the analysis of an example of dissociation discussed by van Rees in her systematic approach to dissociation (2002, 2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2007), in which Maria Montessori’s granddaughter, “in answering her grandmother’s critics, not only claims that Montessori was not vain, but also that she loved beautiful clothes” by “replacing the allegation that Montessori is vain by the claim that she (merely) loved beautiful clothes” and thus “tones down the original accusation and [...] removes the sting from it.” (van Rees 2006: 476) In her reply to criticism concerning MM, the granddaughter explicitly denies the first standpoint she is attacking by dissociation:

4.
She loved beautiful clothes, but was not vain. She had the gift of a profound scholarly modesty. She was driven, something different from ambition. She saw the education of the children of this world as her task. Rather she was a medium.¹⁹ (example taken from van Rees 2002)

This explicit denial linguistically amounts – as in AN’s case – to repetition of the same statement in the negative (*was not vain*); the second standpoint (*MM was ambitious*) is semi-explicitly denied through dissociation again by recalling the lexical item used in the attacked standpoint (*something different from ambition*).

6. Antagonist reporting the protagonist’s belief: using indirect speech in non-opaque contexts

Another type of dissociation that relies on a similar mechanism is the one in excerpt (5.) from a scientific article:

5.
Frege (1977) *seemed to believe* that mere embedding did the trick by bringing about reference shifts. [...] Quine (1956) *appears to believe* that along with a logical / syntactic distinction, there is also a lexical distinction between a notional ‘believes’ and a relational ‘believes’.²⁰ [2]

¹⁹ The passage excerpted by van Rees is the following: «That her grandmother is known for being ambitious and vain, she also deems irrelevant. And incorrect, as well. ‘She loved beautiful clothes, but was not vain. She had the gift of a profound scholarly modesty. She was driven, something different from ambition. She saw the education of the children of this world as her task. Rather she was a medium. I remember that in a discussion with my father she picked up a book by herself and said: “Look, it says here”. So not: I say. She relayed what she knew’.» (*De Volkskrant*, October 5, 1999)

²⁰ See the full excerpt in Appendix 2.

From the linguistic perspective, this dissociation is indirect in that it looks like an informative assertive speech act, while it also allows the author of the article to act as an antagonist of Frege's or Quine's standpoints (and, as the article shows, of a large scientific community). It is clear that *seem* and *appear* are not used here to indicate the uncertainty of the speaker with regard to the beliefs in question, as it might be the case in ordinary contexts such as *You seem to believe that she is not at home*, where the addressee could confirm his / her belief, or *He seems to believe that she is not at home*, where the owner of the ascribed belief might not be (necessarily) consulted for confirmation. Although the line of argumentation is not complete in excerpt (5.), in my opinion, the use of verbs such as *seem* and *appear* in combination with *believe* allows the author to establish a distinction between what Frege or Quine believe to be the case and what himself thinks to be most appropriate. The simple use of the verb *believe* would have contributed to expressing the fact that the author of the article does not necessarily agree to their standpoint. Yet the semantics of *believe* is ambiguous, since it opacifies the speaker's belief on another speaker's object of belief. An utterance such as *F believes X*, performed by speaker L, has at least three possible readings: 1) "L believes X"; 2) "L does not believe X"; 3) L's reporting of F's belief has (also) another purpose than reporting his own belief. I presume that readings 2) and 3) occur in most cases and that they are simultaneous; in other words, on most occasions, in saying that someone believes X, L tends to say that he does not agree to X and one of the reasons for which L is reporting that belief is to criticize it or to question it. For utterances comprising phrases such as *F appears / seems to believe X*, I suggest that two different meanings may be encoded, according to the discourse type (i.e. such utterances are of the type which are contextually – institutionally and discursively – constrained, cf. van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2007: 375-376): 1) L is unsure of F's belief, which can be the case in various ordinary conversational contexts²¹; 2) L treats F's belief as acceptable at some level and arguable at another level, which I take to be those of appearance and reality, and this presumably happens in contexts where scientific theories and / or assumptions are reported (i. e. academic discourse, scientific articles). In the latter case, while a phrase such as *appears / seems to believe* is used by an author S to introduce a belief belonging to some authority A in a given scientific domain – such a phrase being also replaceable by *claims / asserts / states*, I advance that *appears / seems to believe* introduces or indicates a dissociation between, on the one hand, what is the case for A (and a scientific community agreeing to this scientific representation) and, on the other hand, what is the case for S – this representing a "new" or an existent representation, taken to be the "real" one with respect to a particular scientific framework. This can also be the case in excerpt (6.)²²:

6.
 While *it might appear* that there is an irreconcilable difference between Shapiro and Balaguer on what the relevant notion of "consistency" / coherence is, I don't believe that the dispute is as severe as *it appears to be*. Shapiro *appears to believe* that, in exploiting an anti-realist notion of "consistency", Balaguer is attempting to provide an epistemological grounding for mathematics [...] Yet Shapiro has not interpreted Balaguer correctly. ([Note:] The quote at the end of this section will provide support for my interpretation being preferable to Shapiro's.) [...] I think that Balaguer has – or should have

²¹ «Although Musharraf seems to believe that he can continue calling the shots, his political space is narrowing.» (*Herald Tribune*, Nov. 14, 2007)

²² See the full excerpt in Appendix 3. The PhD dissertation this text is excerpted from has been written under Shapiro's supervision.

– a weaker epistemological goal in mind. His goal should merely be this: to show that obtaining knowledge of pure mathematical truths does not involve being in “contact with” Platonistically construed mathematical domains. [...] So, *despite appearances*, Balaguer and Shapiro can agree on a notion of “consistency” / coherence. [...] It is a notion of this type that I have been using and will continue to use when I use the term ‘coherence’. [3]

In this excerpt, as in the previous one, phrasing a belief as *Shapiro appears to believe* does not indicate, in my opinion, the speaker’s uncertainty with respect to Shapiro’s belief, but rather the fact that this belief only *appears* as correct and acceptable, but in reality there could be another interpretation of the phenomenon taken into discussion. I also advance that the other occurrences of the notion of *appearance* (verb *appear* – 2 occurrences, noun *appearance* – 1 occurrence) in the co-text of this phrase in excerpt (6.) are meant to underline the dissociation between what it appears to be the solution and what the real solution is or could be (see italics above). To this interpretation adds the presence of the concessive *while* in the first sentence of the excerpt: *while* introduces the clause that refers to *appearance*, which is again notionally referred to at the very end of the sentence by the phrase *as it appears to be*; the contents of the first clause is in contrast with that of the main clause which expresses rather than the author’s belief, the explicit ascribing by this belief to the author herself, by the very expression *I don’t believe*, which downtones her criticism.

7. Procedural BUT

In excerpts (1.) and (6.), the dissociation is in some way ‘indicated’ or announced, in a different way, by the presence of a particle which can be a connective such as *but*, *however*, *yet*, usually suggesting denial of the previous statement, or a subordinating concessive conjunction, such as *while*:

1.
I feel very much at home in America. And I'm sure that my Greek friends and family think of me as American. But I speak perfect Greek, I've never lost my accent. [1]

6.
While *it might appear* that there is an irreconcilable difference between Shapiro and Balaguer on what the relevant notion of “consistency” / coherence is, I don’t believe that the dispute is as severe as *it appears to be*. [3]

In what follows, I am not discussing the concessive particles *however*, *yet* and *while*. I only deal with *but*, by advancing that one may interpret it as diverting the protagonist from the original standpoint in one of the following ways:

1) *But* is used by the antagonist to introduce a standpoint opposite to the one put forward by the protagonist, or denies that this standpoint is correct / acceptable, such as in examples provided and discussed by van Rees (2002, 2003 etc.), this being preceded by a clause referring to some notional characteristic or property that guides the protagonist or the hearer towards adopting another standpoint, not necessarily explicit in the context:

4.

She loved beautiful clothes, but was not vain.

7.

A good, elegant soccer player thus started to play below his level. ‘At that time that was a choice because I had few other options.’ But he has no regrets. ‘*It’s a pity, but a pity is something else than regret.*’ [This could be also phrased as *but this is not regret*] (example taken from van Rees 2002)

This is also the case in the following excerpt in which President Clinton *seems to* agree to the standpoint advanced that *He was alone with ML* after introducing an implicit dissociation based on a proposal of re-definition of *being alone with smb*, which is made more or less explicit in the near context later on:

8.

Q: Do you agree with me that the statement, “I was never alone with her”, is incorrect? You were alone with Monica Lewinsky, weren’t you?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Well, again, it depends on how you define alone. *Yes, we were alone from time to time*, even during 1997, even when there was absolutely no improper contact occurring. *Yes, that is accurate.* But there were also a lot of times when, even though no one could see us, the doors were open to the halls, on both ends of the halls, people could hear. [...] So, *there were a lot of times when we were alone, but I never really thought we were.* [...] Betty was always around [...] [my italics] [4]

In this case, the pattern of the dissociation is something like the following sequence of speech acts:

{usage declarative {proposing a re-definition of *alone*}}
{assertive {agreement to the other speaker’s standpoint – downtoning by *from time to time*}}
{assertive {iterating {agreement to the other speaker’s standpoint}}}
implicit attack at the other party’s standpoint = confrontation stage: {indirect usage declarative {implicit dissociation {implicit definition of *not alone* {assertive: *the doors were open to the halls, on both ends of the halls, people could hear*}}}
{assertive {re-iterating {agreement to the other speaker’s standpoint – downtoning the initial standpoint by *a lot of times*}}}
{assertive {recalling {implicit dissociation *I never really thought* {one’s former standpoint *We were not alone*}}}
{indirect usage declarative {continuing the implicit definition of *not alone* {assertive: *Betty was always around*}}}

The dissociation performed by President Clinton mainly by the proposal of re-definition for *alone* and by *but I never really thought we were* attacks the standpoint that at some previous hearing the President “lied”, by distinguishing between:

- a) what he thought at that time to be the meaning of *alone* (which he still considers to be correct) and, consequently, the position he undertook at that time (A) *I was never alone with her*;
- b) what he can admit at this time to be another meaning of *alone* (which he deems acceptable, yet not completely correct) and, consequently, his present position (B) *We were alone*.

This dissociation allows him to present both positions as acceptable, based on the assumption that the same referential situation can be described in two opposite ways

according to the meaning of *alone*: 1) completely out of anyone's sight, hearing, ability to be physically reached; 2) completely out of anyone's sight. This interpretation also allows to qualify the two opposite statements made by the President at different times as both correct: if the first meaning of *alone* is the real one, then (A) is true; if the second meaning of *alone* is the real one, then (B) is true. Since at the time of the President's uttering (A) he considered *alone* to have the first meaning, he was really telling the truth and only apparently lying. Since at this time the President holds as correct the second meaning of *alone*, he is telling the truth, yet implicitly requiring the other party and / or the hearer to admit that although they were alone, they were easily within reach of all those usually around (*people, Navy stewards, Betty*).

2) After an initial repetition or (most convenient) reformulation of the protagonist's standpoint, the antagonist introduces by means of *but* some notional characteristic or property which guides the protagonist or the hearer towards adopting another standpoint, again not necessarily explicit in the near context, as in:

1.

I feel very much at home in America. And I'm sure that my Greek friends and family think of me as American. [This could be also phrased exactly as the protagonist's standpoint: I feel completely American.] But I speak perfect Greek, I've never lost my accent.

To finish this analysis by reference to the same excerpt I began with, I suggest that in this situation one may consider that the notion of *feeling at home in America* is explicated – in an Exposition discourse pattern – by the method of contrast, by polarization of the notions *American* and *Greek*. Inside this polarity, the notion of *being a Greek* is explicated by the method of particulars, by explicit reference to some particular instances of the notion: *speaking Greek, preserving the Greek accent*.

Final Remarks

In this presentation my goal was to lay stress on several linguistic patterns that contribute to enhancing the rhetorical effectiveness of discourse by dissociation used as strategic maneuvering. Dissociation is a good candidate for being used as strategic maneuver, by allowing any of the parties engaging in it to reconcile dialectical and rhetorical objectives. The latter are reached mainly by linguistic devices which contribute to wording an attack at a standpoint – which I consider to be the prototypical dissociation – by using as much of the lexical and semantic material of the attacked standpoint and by instructing the other party or the hearer to operate – through discourse interpretation – a shift in his / her way of constructing the real. The three linguistic device taken into discussion were:

- a) repetition by the antagonist of lexical items and of notional content in the initial standpoint, consisting in fact in reformulating the initial standpoint so as that it words the opposite standpoint or a standpoint easier to defend;
- b) reporting somebody else's standpoint by making it dependent from a *seem / appear to believe* phrase, consisting in fact in implicitly and concessively advancing another standpoint, while not agreeing to the reported one;
- c) using (provisionally called) procedural *but*, to instruct the other party to take another direction than the one presented in the standpoint.

In all of these cases, besides distinction, negation, definition, precization, and terming, *concession* is of particular importance as an argumentative countermove and it essentially contributes to making dissociation work as strategic maneuver.

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Appendix 1

David Carrier [DC]: Alexander, you were born into a privileged family in Greece; you studied at Swarthmore and Princeton; you are, by background and choice, an aristocratic personality who holds liberal political sentiments. Is that fair?

Alexander Nehamas [AN]: Fair, except that from my family's point of view, I'm a failure. Greece was not and is not a country where an intellectual and academic career is considered proper. It's all right to be cultured and educated, but you are not really supposed to live off your education. You work; it's a mercantile society.

DC: "Aristocratic" has all the wrong connotations?

AN: Not quite. Greece was never aristocratic in the traditional sense, where work is something you don't dirty your hands with. It's a bourgeois society. But when I was growing up, pieces of the culture of pre-World War I Europe were still alive there. It was a contradictory society. My parents, for example, spoke French at home, not Greek. My father was in banking. But banking is something a true aristocrat looks down on. Banking is a business, aristocrats own land.

DC: You really went wrong.

AN: I failed... What happened in my case might have been a long-term project that started when I first read Spinoza in high school and decided that was what I would do for the rest of my life. Or it might have been that I walked backwards into a life, deciding to do whatever seemed easiest at the time, just postponing difficult decisions indefinitely. Either by design or by accident, I ended up in philosophy. It was June of my senior year at Swarthmore when I decided. There had been a coup d'etat in Greece that spring, 1967, and I decided I didn't want to go back yet. So I came to Princeton to get a Ph.D. in philosophy, and of course my idea wasn't to look for a job in philosophy--but I happened to find a pretty good position and five years later, I got tenure and saw that philosophy was where I belonged. Then I got really depressed; it was at that point I realized I had failed.

DC: It was too late to go to business school.

AN: It was too late. I was thirty, and I belonged to this other world.

DC: You chose to fail all the way through.

AN: Yes, you might put it that way. My official plan was to go into business and retire at a relatively young age in order to discuss intellectual issues on my yacht. But I never got a yacht, I got tenure instead.

DC: When we first met, you were the most exotic person it had been my good fortune to meet in Pittsburgh, and yet you feel completely American, don't you?

AN: I feel very much at home in America. And I'm sure that my Greek friends and family think of me as American. But I speak perfect Greek, I've never lost my accent.

DC: Because you've gone back regularly?

AN: Yes. And because speaking the language shows me that I am still part of that society as well. You see, I still want to retire on a yacht! What I really mean is this: I'm as committed an intellectual and academic as one can be; but I am also interested in, I appreciate, am able to deal with the public world, the world of business, the world of society. That means that I can play one against the other. I can say, I'm not quite one of you. The same thing applies to Greece and America. I can act perfectly comfortable in either society, but I can also withdraw and say: Among you, but not of you--to paraphrase Byron. That is a pattern I see in myself, and in my work within the academy. I work in Greek philosophy, but I don't just do Greek philosophy, so perhaps I can write Greek philosophy in a slightly different way. I work on Nietzsche and the philosophy of art, and I also keep thinking about Plato, so I can write differently about Nietzsche or about art. I

work in comparative literature. I see myself as always trying to straddle things. That, of course, can be either a healthy or a seriously unhealthy feature.

DC: Would you confess to being an elitist?

AN: An elitist may be someone who thinks that people have different talents and abilities, and if that's what an elitist is, I absolutely am one. I think that talents are not equally distributed. Elitism about talent has nothing to do with justice, the distribution of political power, or political privilege. With the same opportunities a few people are going to do better than most others, and those who do better are those I admire. But I would not deprive those who do worse of political rights, nor would I presume to know in advance who has, and who lacks, talent. That is determined only after the fact. It's stupid to think you are a special person if you have not already done something special, and perhaps it's stupid even then. What counts is what you do.

[...]

DC: In *The Art of Living* you note that Foucault thought of his writing "as a model for groups, particularly homosexuals and other oppressed minorities...unable to speak with a voice of their own." Is there any parallel in your life? For whom are you speaking? For whom can you speak?

AN: That's very difficult to answer. I haven't thought of myself as speaking for a group; that's why I have made such an effort to read my favorite philosophical and literary authors as individuals. I find that Nietzsche or Montaigne are different from Foucault. These two care for themselves, they are concerned with their own, personal life, not with the welfare of some group. And yet the dominant trend in recent years has been to make philosophy look more and more like a science. And it's been very difficult for those of us who have a different vision to speak out. So here is a group for which I perhaps speak--philosophical "cosmopolitans" and cosmopolitans in general. Cosmopolitans refuse to belong exclusively to a single tribe, whether the tribe is a nation, a profession, or a discipline. I think of myself as a cosmopolitan. To be a cosmopolitan is not to belong nowhere; it is to belong to many places.

DC: But you are a Greek-American.

AN: I am not a Greek-American. I am a Greek. And an American. And also a Spanish citizen. And a philosopher. And a critic. And I like Proust. And television. And argument. Interpretation. Intelligence. Sensibility.

Appendix 2

I hasten to acknowledge that philosophers have proposed a wide variety of mechanisms – some syntactic, some lexical, some pragmatic and contextual – by which modes of presentation and their ilk manage to be put at semantic issue. Frege (1977) seemed to believe that mere embedding did the trick by bringing about reference shifts. Russell (1905) distinguishes two classes of ascriptions by appeal to facts about relative scope of quantifiers and operators as exhibited at the level of “logical form” as the primary mechanism. Quine (1956) appears to believe that along with a logical / syntactic distinction, there is also a lexical distinction between a notional ‘believes’ and a relational ‘believes’. [...] ... I count the one and all as advocates of still of at least the core of the conventional wisdom.

In this essay, I challenge the conventional wisdom by challenging one of its consequences.

Appendix 3

While it might appear that there is an irreconcilable difference between Shapiro and Balaguer on what the relevant notion of “consistency”/coherence is, I don’t believe that the dispute is as severe as it appears to be. Shapiro appears to believe that, in exploiting an anti-realist notion of “consistency”, Balaguer is attempting to provide an epistemological grounding for mathematics, i.e., to ground mathematics epistemologically in something epistemologically more secure than mathematics itself – specifically, the anti-realist modal primitive that FBPists’ explication of “consistency” invokes. In a number of places, Shapiro has offered convincing arguments against the possibility of providing such an epistemological grounding for mathematics (cf., e.g., (Shapiro, 1991) and Shapiro (1993)). In fact, (Shapiro, 1993) is specifically directed against anti-realist modal strategies for providing such an epistemological grounding for mathematics. Yet Shapiro has not interpreted Balaguer correctly. [Note: The quote at the end of this section will provide support for my interpretation being preferable to Shapiro’s.] Or if he has, then there is no need for Balaguer to be attempting to provide an epistemological grounding for mathematics. I think that Balaguer has – or should have – a weaker epistemological goal in mind. His goal should merely be this: to show that obtaining knowledge of pure mathematical truths does not involve being in “contact with” Platonistically construed mathematical domains. This is something that Shapiro should be in a position to agree with Balaguer about. It is, after all, the heart of his own solution to the epistemological worries about Platonism. By formulating his position using an anti-realist notion of “consistency”, Balaguer is attempting to make it plausible that knowledge of pure mathematical truths does not involve being in “contact with” Platonistically construed mathematical domains. This situation is quite compatible with our knowledge of whether a theory is “consistent” being no more secure than our knowledge that the mathematical domain described by that theory exists. Indeed, Balaguer can agree with Shapiro that both pieces of knowledge are nontrivial and that the two are equally difficult to obtain. All that Balaguer need insist on is that neither involves being in “contact with” Platonistically construed mathematical domains. So, despite appearances, Balaguer and Shapiro can agree on a notion of “consistency”/ coherence. It is one that, as Shapiro explains above, is neither deductive consistency nor satisfiability, though satisfiability is a good “model” for it. Further, it is, as Shapiro insists, a primitive that is epistemologically no more secure than mathematical knowledge itself. It is a notion of this type that I have been using and will continue to use when I use the term ‘coherence’.

Appendix 4

Q: Do you agree with me that the statement, “I was never alone with her”, is incorrect? You were alone with Monica Lewinsky, weren't you?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Well, again, it depends on how you define alone. Yes, we were alone from time to time, even during 1997, even when there was absolutely no improper contact occurring. Yes, that is accurate. But there were also a lot of times when, even though no one could see us, the doors were open to the halls, on both ends of the halls, people could hear. The Navy stewards could come in and out at will, if they were around. Other things could be happening. So, there were a lot of times when we were alone, *but I never really thought we were*. And sometimes when we, when – but, as far as I know, what I was trying to determine, if I might, is that Betty was always around, and I believe she was always around where I could basically call her or get her if I needed her.